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SUMMARY 
The recent worldwide economic crisis had drastic consequences for the economies of nations around the globe. As we are at 
the end of the crisis period, the really interesting strategic question is: what will happen after the crisis. We have some, but 
only limited, research evidence to answer this question properly. Scholars try to obtain answers by studying the consequences 
of the previous crisis periods. However, the recent crisis was unique in its expansion and rather accelerated spread all over 
the world.The present paper attempts to analyze this issue from a company-level point of view. We are interested in learning 
what has happened during the crisis, and what the reactions of companies were to the emerging new economic, technological 
and social conditions. The author has conducted empirical studies in Hungary and in the Slovak Republic. The empirical 
background of the paper includes studies of publications of research groups engaged in doing surveys in the field, as well as 
primary data collections through questionnaire surveys and interviews conducted in Hungary and in Slovakia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent worldwide economic crisis had drastic 
consequences for economies around the world. Cross-
border business and international trade declined in 2009 by 
about 9%, while foreign direct investment dropped by 
more than 40% in the same year (Ghemawat, 2010). While 
the leading nations of the world economy were plagued 
with recession, countries like China and India continued 
their growth path. In 2009 China realized 66% of the 
global growth in GDP, and India 11% (Ghemawat, 2010). 
The projected high growth rate of the BRIC1 countries will 
lead to radical restructuring in the world economy with 
North America and Europe losing their previous political 
and economic influence. 
The crisis has had an enormous influence on the 
transforming Central and Eastern European economies as 
well. Some of these countries, like Hungary, Romania and 
Bulgaria had serious difficulties due to  
1Brazil, Russia, India and China 
macroeconomic imbalance and increasing inflation (L. 
Muraközy, 2010). These countries were not prepared for 
the consequences of the rapidly spreading crisis, and – 
contributing further to the difficulties – seriously 
underestimated the possible extent of the crisis. At the end 
of the crisis, the really interesting strategic question is what 
will happen next. Will the development path repeat the 
tendencies followed before the crisis, or will totally new 
directions of development emerge? We have rather limited 
research evidence to answer this question properly. 
Scholars try to get answers by studying the consequences 
of the previous crisis periods (Gulati, et al. 2010). But the 
recent crisis was unique in its nature, expansion and rather 
accelerated spread across the world, and therefore it is not 
certain that the processes will be the same as in recovery 
from earlier crises. 
This paper tries to analyze the above issue from a 
company angle. We are interested in learning what has 
happened in companies during the crisis, what their 
reactions were to the emerging new economic, 
technological and social conditions, and what tendencies 
of development may be identified recently. The empirical 
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background of the paper includes an analysis of 
publications of researchers engaged in doing surveys in the 
field (e.g. Ringland et al. 2000; Waldman, 2010), as well 
as primary data collections through questionnaire surveys 
and interviews conducted in Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic. 
MACROECONOMIC 
BACKGROUND 
Hungary and Slovakia have many similarities 
concerning their social, economic and political heritage 
dating back to the period before the political changes 
around 1990 (Kiezun, 1991). But behind these similarities 
there are interesting alterations in the patterns of 
development, especially after 1990 (Balaton, 2007).  
Hungary was rather successful in hosting a relatively 
large volume of foreign direct investments (FDI) during 
the first half of the 1990s. The Hungarian Government 
decided to adopt the sales type of privatization. This meant 
that state owned firms were offered for sale to those who 
could offer acceptable prices for the companies. As capital 
inside the country was rather limited, that type of 
privatization resulted in the overwhelming role of foreign 
investors in the ownership structure of enterprises located 
in Hungary by the end of the century. 
Slovakia (and, until January 1993 Czechoslovakia) 
followed a different economic policy concerning 
privatization. Vouchers were distributed among the 
population and these vouchers could be exchanged for 
shares of state owned enterprises. The shares were then 
purchased by the investment funds owned by state owned 
banks. So the “privatization” had resulted in restored state 
ownership of enterprises by the mid-1990s. No relevant 
structural changes were implemented during the first half 
of the 1990s (Clark and Soulsby, 1999).  
This policy had temporary macroeconomic 
advantages compared to Hungary. While in Hungary the 
restructuring was relatively accelerated it resulted in a high 
level of inflation (about 39% in 1993), a depression (38% 
GDP decline between 1989 and 1993 measured by 
comparable prices), and an unemployment rate of about 
17% (Kornai, 1993), while in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia there were no such radical consequences. 
Economic restructuring took a major step after the 
involvement of foreign direct investors during the second 
half of the 1990s. The necessary restructuring resulted in 
economic slow-down, inflation and increasing 
unemployment as well, but these consequences were 
moderate in their extent compared to those of Hungary.  
Slovakia was rather successful since the second half 
of the 1990s in inviting foreign direct investors, especially 
in the automobile industry. This fact contributed to the 
relatively fast growth rate of the Slovak Republic around 
the turn of the century and helped the integration of 
Slovakia into the European Union. The growth rate of the 
country even accelerated after the integration and this 
resulted in the capability to change to the euro as the 
national currency in 2009.  
In the same period Hungary became less attractive 
for foreign investors, partially due to high tax rates and 
increasing level of macroeconomic instability, parallel 
with rapidly spreading corruption. During the period 
between 2002 and 2010 the economic stability of Hungary 
eroded and the county became incapable of introducing the 
euro. State expenditures exceeded the level of income and 
the county was near to bankruptcy during the summer of 
2010. The newly elected Government has introduced 
radical measures to restore the balance and their results 
could be observed after 2011.  
PREVIOUS RESEARCH EVIDENCE 
ON STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE CRISIS AT ENTERPRISE 
LEVEL 
The start of the late economic crisis was marked by 
Lehman Brothers filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on September 15, 2008. Within six months the 
crisis has spread throughout the world and endangered 
many previously successful economies like Ireland. Even 
economically stable economies like the US, Germany and 
France were seriously hit and the consequences would 
influence the coming years in nearly all countries of the 
world.  
As the crisis had approached its end, more and more 
scholars were interested in discovering what would happen 
after the crisis. Harvard Business Review has published a 
series of three papers in the March 2010 issue, spotlighting 
the topic of strategy in a weak recovery. The articles by 
influential authors such as Pankaj Ghemawat, Ranjay 
Gulati, and Nitin Nohria agreed that rather limited research 
evidence was available in the field and they tried to get 
ideas by studying the experiences of the previous crises 
since 1980. Although the authors admit that the previous 
crises were much more limited in their expansion and were 
also different in their origin and nature, they arrived at 
some conclusions worth having in mind when thinking on 
possible future enterprise strategies after the present 
economic crisis. One of the important conclusions drawn 
by Gulati et al. (2010) is that concentration only on cost-
cutting during the crisis is unlikely to lead to successful 
expansion after the crisis (Gulati et al., 2010). The authors 
found that emphasis on operational efficiency parallel with 
concentration on market development and asset 
investment have resulted in the best results measured by 
increase in sales income and earnings before interests, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) (Gulati et 
al., 2010). Mere concentration on reduction of 
employment level and cost cutting did not result in 
successful recovery after the crisis. It is also noteworthy 
from their study that concentration only on innovation and 
asset investment during the crisis was not connected to 
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successful enterprise performance after the crisis. So 
neither restriction nor mere innovation in itself seemed to 
be the proper cure during the economic crisis. Another 
lesson to bear in mind is that rapid, short term solutions 
often have disadvantages when evaluated by taking into 
account consequences in the long run (March, 2003). 
Ghemawat (2010) forecast the possibly more 
important role in adapting to local norms and the growing 
organizational power of the local country. Parallel with 
increased pressures on pricing, multinational companies 
have to be sensitive to regional varieties of offering, as 
local differences will become more important. These 
organizational changes will increase diversity within 
multinational firm, but at the same time they will increase 
the need for cohesive corporate cultures and tightening 
talent management practices (Ghemawat, 2010).  
As a consequence of the accelerated changes and 
turbulence during the last few years some authors speak 
about the next wave of creative disruption. Waldman in his 
recent book postulates: “In fact, the growth of the mobile 
internet, the return of economic growth after 2012, and the 
constant potential for entrepreneurs to come up with 
products and service that satisfy fundamental consumer 
need are, I believe, going to drive another great wave of 
creative disruption in the near future.” (Waldman 
2010:46). He than states, “I predict that the era of creative 
disruption has only really just begun.” (Waldman, 
2010:48).  
The radical strategic changes that may emerge 
during the coming years will probably have an influence 
of the organizational structures and processes companies 
will be adopting. Ringland et al. (2010) speak about 
double-cone organizations where traditional hierarchy 
dealing with specified and routinized activities will be 
existing parallel with activities characterized by lack of 
clarity, ad hoc solutions, private inspiration, and luck. 
Summarizing the above discussed predictions for the 
after-crisis situation it may be perceived that there seem to 
be limited possibilities for using the previously prescribed 
solutions. Learning, adaptation to emerging new situations 
and flexibility may be regarded as crucial capabilities that 
organizations of the future will need in order to be 
competitive. Bahrami and Evans have formulated that 
requirement as follows: “The object of becoming super-
flexible is to be able to either intentionally precipitate a 
transformation, or to make modifications in response to 
changing situations. Adaptation occurs either during the 
course of, or after, an unfolding change episode, and may 
simply be random in that one may be just at the right place 
at the right time.” (Bahrami and Evans, 2005:22).  
RESEARCH METHODS AND 
SAMPLES 
Research methods utilized in both countries included 
questionnaire surveys, interviews with top managers, 
analysis of company documents and case study 
development. 
The Hungarian surveys were part of a larger research 
endeavor aiming at studying the competitiveness of 
Hungarian enterprises. The first survey was conducted in 
Hungary between April and November 2009. The author’s 
personal involvement in the research was connected to 
developing the questionnaire and analysing the survey data 
and writing working papers. The survey collected answers 
from 1.246 top managers working in 313 enterprises, 
belonging mainly to the SME sector. Distribution of firms 
according to the number of employees was as follows: 
21% of the firms had below 50 employees, 47% between 
50 and 99 employees, 20% between 100 and 249, and only 
2% had more than one thousand employees. 
Manufacturing industry companies represented 42.4% of 
the sample, service firms had a ratio of 23.0%, and trading 
companies 19.1%. In data analysis descriptive statistics, 
correlation analysis, factor and cluster analysis were use. 
The empirical findings used in the present paper were 
published in the Preliminary Report of the survey (Chikán 
et al., 2010).  
The second survey was conducted between May and 
November 2013. The survey collected answeres from 
1.200 managers of 300 enterprises. Size distribution of the 
sample according to number of employees was as follows: 
11% of the firm employed less that 50 persons, 48% 
between 50 and 99 employees, 26% between 100 and 249 
employees, and 16% had more than 250 persons. 
Distribution of companies according to branches of the 
economy was the following: 8% of firms belonged to 
agriculture, 45% to the processing industry, 4% to the 
supply of electric energy and gas, 8% to the construction 
industry, 20% to trade, 6% to the hotel and catering trade, 
and 9% to logistics. Data analysis methods were the same 
as in 2009. The findings were published in the Preliminary 
Report of the survey (Chikán et al., 2014. The present 
author’s personal involvement was participation in 
revising the questionnaire.  
Overlap of the companies in the two surveys is 
limited, although in the survey of 2013 each of the 
companies were asked who participated in the previous 
survey in 2009. The structure of the two samples is similar 
according to size and profile of companies.  
In Slovakia the questionnaire survey, the case 
studies and the interviews were conducted by graduating 
students at master’s level under the supervision of the 
author. The Slovakian questionnaire survey was conducted 
between September 2008 and February 2009, and included 
200 companies. Distribution according to the number of 
employees was as follows: below 10 employees: 34%, 
between 10 and 49: 39%, between 50 and 99: 14%, 
between 100 and 249: 13%. Of the firms, 49% of the firms 
belonged to the service sector, 34% to industry, 4% to 
agriculture, and 12% to public administration (K. 
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Muraközy, 2009). Data analysis methods included 
descriptive statistics and correlation analysis.  
REACTIONS OF ENTERPRISES TO 
THE CRISIS IN HUNGARY AND 
SLOVAKIA 
In this section we summarized the findings of the 
empirical research conducted in the two countries. 
Hungarian experiences 
As it was mentioned above, in Hungary there were 
two surveys during the period of the economic crisis. 
Bellow we provide a short account of the major findings.  
Survey results from 2009 
The empirical evidence from the questionnaire 
survey of 2009 in Hungary shows that the first – and most 
frequently observable – reaction of enterprises was to 
reduce cost levels, to downsize operations and to reshape 
organizational structures towards more simple and less 
expensive management systems. This is the traditionally 
observable reaction of companies and this strategy is most 
frequently advised to company managers by standard 
textbooks of economics and management. This strategy 
has resulted in many cases in the capabilitiy to survive the 
crisis situation and preserve conditions for continuing 
business activities when the crisis reaches its end.  
Our sample shows that 34.6% of the companies 
suffered a decrease of more than 10%  in domestic sales 
turnover in 2009 compared to the previous year, while 
20.3% experienced a  less than 10% decrease. Of the firms, 
24.5% of the firms reported stagnation in their domestic 
sales. 35.9% realized less than 10% growth, and 15.0% 
managed to increase domestic sales turnover by more than 
10%. 
In export sales 40.4% of the companies reported an 
annual decrease of more than 10%, and 20.2% less than a 
10% decrease. Of the firms in our sample, 18% 
experienced stagnation in exports, and 13.5% managed to 
realize modest growth (bellow 10%), while only 7% were 
capable of increasing export sales by more than 10%. 
The crisis resulted in relevant changes in company 
strategies. While during the previous surveys (in 2004, 
1999, and 1996) realization of profit was the most 
important target, in the 2009 survey 170 companies 
(60,3%) gave the answer that surviving the crisis was the 
most important aim, and 123 mentioned profit realization 
as the No. 1 strategic goal. There was no relevant 
difference among the companies according to their size. 
The most frequently followed strategy was defensive (26% 
of firms), and the shrinking strategy proved to be second 
most frequent (20% of companies). In 2008 growth 
oriented strategies were the most frequently observable 
ones (43%), and defensive strategies were followed by less 
than 10 % of the firms. In 2009 companies mainly used 
their resources to defend their existing market positions. 
The defensive strategy in many cases was not the 
consequence of a purposeful strategy, but more as a result 
of a lack of strategy and a situation which might be 
described as muddling-through. Lack of clearly defined 
strategies was observed more frequently in case of smaller 
firms. We did not find any relevant effects of industry on 
the strategic orientation of firms.  
It was a clear sign of defensive enterprise strategies 
that R&D was evaluated as the least important functional 
area within the company. 43% of the firms did not have 
branded products. The companies in our sample more 
frequently used the company name as the brand name, and 
only one fifth of the sample firms had an independent 
product brand name. The ratio of companies introducing 
new products and technologies had decreased compared to 
the previous survey in 2004. Companies generally 
complained that they got limited state support for 
innovation and lack of adequate financial resources was 
mentioned as a major reason behind the limited 
innovation. The importance of organization development 
was also under-evaluated by the responding managers. 
Modernization of organizational and management 
structures were given rather limited importance among the 
priorities of top managers.  
The overall picture observable in the survey in 2009 
shows a rather defensive management approaches where 
companies concentrated only on survival. They generally 
did not have strategies concerning how to start 
development, had rather restricted information on their 
future possibilities, and in many cases had no clear 
strategic direction. We could hardly observe any conscious 
steps to improve existing products or even more develop 
new products or upgrade technologies. The marketing 
efforts only concentrated on maintaining existing market 
shares and there were hardly any signs of trying to enter 
into new markets and develop products to be sold on new 
markets.  
The overall picture of the Hungarian enterprises in 
2009 showed that the necessary preparatory actions for the 
period after the crisis were missing in the practices of 
enterprise managers in our sample. 
Survey results from 2013 
In 2013, 46% of the companies reported declining 
sales possibilities in the domestic market, and only 18% of 
the respondents gave the answere that their sales options 
had improved in Hungary. Concerning export sales, the 
opinions were rather dispersed: 27% of the firms perceived 
improvement, while 25% saw declining sales possibilities 
abroad. The export sales was mainly oriented towards the 
developed Western-European EU member states. In 40% 
of the firms the export sales had increased in comparison 
to the value in 2009.  
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41% of the company top managers had the opinion 
that the crisis was more severe than they had expected it to 
be in the autumn of 2008. One third of the managers shared 
the opinion that the crisis was behind them, while 40% had 
the opinion that more than one year would be necessary to 
start growth. Another 17% gave the asnswer that growth 
might start within one year. 
The influence of the crisis was mainly observable in 
the worsening liquidity of customers, in decreasing 
demands and in increasing environmental uncertainty. 
Between 2009 and 2012 the level of production had 
declined or stagnated in about 80% of the companies in our 
sample.  
69% of the respondents shared the opinion that they 
are fast adapters to the changing conditions. 57% of the 
firms did not have a written strategy, but had a shared 
picture for the future. The average time horizon of strategic 
planning had increased a bit compared to the previous 
survey. The percentage of companies developing 
strategies for the next 2 to 5 years had increased, while the 
ratio of firms having strategies for only the next 1 to 2 
years had decreased. About half of the companies update 
their strategies annually. The most frequently observable 
strategy was concentration on stabilization, while during 
the previous survey a defensive strategy was the most 
widespread.  
In strategy implementation the companies 
concentrated on product differentiation and quality 
improvement. Introduction of new products was not 
characteristic for the firms in the sample. In marketing, 
reduction of costs was a generally observable feature. The 
value of investments has decreased or remained at the 
same level in about two thirds of the firms. R&D 
expenditures have decreased in more than one third of the 
companies. Profitability did  not reach the planned level. 
Strategic alliances had increased in marketing and sales, 
but not in R&D. At the same time the managers accepted 
the need for increasing R&D and innovation.   
Comparing the survey results of 2009 and 2013, we 
can not identify drastic changes in the strategic orientation 
of Hungarian enterprises. There were, however, some 
weak signs of getting to the end of the crisis period and 
starting preparation for the future. This could be observed 
in the practices of product improvement and quality 
enhancement, and in emerging strategic alliances in 
marketing and sales. R&D and innovation, however, had 
not improved to any significant extent. It is a positive sign 
that enterprise managers had become aware of the need to 
increase their activity in R&D. It may be stated that 
enterprise managers were still in a waiting position – that 
is waiting for the start of economic growth – and their 
strategy was still waiting for this point before beginning 
innovative and growth oriented activities.  
Slovakian experiences 
The overall picture of the survey (conducted 
between September 2008 and February 2009)    reveals that 
companies stagnated or decreased the volume of their 
output. A majority of the responding managers (59%) 
shared the view that the crises would last for about 2 to 3 
years (the end of the crisis was connected to the start of an 
increase in the GDP of the country).  
Labor costs were unchanged in 51% of the 
companies, while 26% reported a decrease, and another 
15% forecasted changes during the coming months. A 
possible increase in wage level was mentioned by 5% of 
the respondents. Expenditure related to education and 
training was unchanged in 33% of the firms, decreased in 
31%, and 21% of the managers expected a decrease during 
2009. 
Costs related to advertisement and communication 
remained unchanged in 34% of the firms, decreased in 
29%, and an expected decrease was reported by 17% of the 
respondents. Expected growth of costs was mentioned by 
13% of the companies in the sample. Overall marketing 
expenditure was unchanged (compared to the previous 
years) in the practice of 60% of the firms, a decrease was 
reported by 14%, and an expected decrease by another 
14%. A possible increase in marketing costs was 
mentioned by 9% of the respondents.  
Investments were reduced in 32% of the companies, 
27% reported no changes, and 28% mentioned a possible 
decrease during the coming months, while an increase in 
investments was forecast by 12% of the firms.  
The introduction of new technologies was reported 
as being unchanged in its intensity during the crisis by 
56%, and decrease was mentioned by 13%. Possible 
decrease in the next years was predicted by 12%, and 
possible increase was mentioned by 15% of respondents. 
Increase in the intensity of introducing new technologies 
was characteristic for 4% of the firms.  
Discussion 
The most characteristic management strategy during 
the crisis in both countries was cost reduction and 
concentration on survival. However, other strategies were 
also observed which were connected to innovation and 
growth. This strategic approach was characteristic of 
enterprise managers having longer term strategic time 
horizons (Csiba, 2010). Another important influencing 
factor behind was the available financial resources to 
provide a possibility for executives to think ahead and start 
preparations for a possible growth period after the crisis. 
Our empirical studies show that this way of thinking was 
observable at the minority of enterprises especially in case 
of SMEs.  
The entrepreneurially minded managers of the latter 
group of firms shared the view that the crisis period is not 
only an area with difficult problems to be solved in a short 
period of time, but at the same time it is a period of 
unprecedented opportunities to move forward and develop 
competitive advantages when increases in demand begin 
arriving (Waldman, 2010). These companies started to 
develop new R&D projects, invested in broader areas of 
innovation and now they are more or less prepared to 
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launch their new products and services which represent a 
higher level of technological development and meet 
customer needs at a higher level compared to the period 
before the crisis. Based on his previous experience and 
insights concerning the future possible directions of 
strategic development, the present author is convinced that 
the success stories after the crisis will be connected to 
enterprises following the innovation trajectory during the 
years of crisis.  
Another field of development observable in our 
empirical studies is related to the increasing role of inter-
organizational relationships through different forms of 
strategic alliances and emergence of clusters. The 
permanent need for cost efficiency and improvement of 
innovation capabilities drives companies towards new 
forms of strategic alliances, enhancing the capabilities of 
business firms to accelerate innovation, develop new 
capabilities through co-operation, share risks and make 
costly innovation projects financially realizable. These 
development tendencies have been observed especially in 
industries characterized by severe competition, high 
technological development rates, and needs for meeting 
new customer expectations (see Hokansson and Lind, 
2004).  
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
We have to admit that the available empirical 
evidence is rather limited from the point of view of making 
a general forecast for future development tendencies. 
However, the observable intentions of enterprises provide 
possibilities for drawing attention to the emerging new 
tendencies and new strategic logic developed by enterprise 
managers. Further and more extended studies will be 
necessary to check whether the directions of development 
indicated by the studies presented here are broadly 
expanding new tendencies of enterprise level strategic 
management or they are only locally observable examples. 
It was observable in both the Hungarian and the 
Slovakian sample that perceptions and intentions of 
managers with an influence on strategic directions of their 
firms have an important role in understanding the 
emerging strategies during and probably after the crisis. 
Therefore, there is a need for further and mainly qualitative 
studies concentrating on behavioral patterns of strategy 
formulation. The approach to strategy advocated by Henry 
Mintzberg and others (Mintzberg, 1994, Mintzberg et al., 
1998, March, 1991, March, 1994). Both the literature and 
our empirical experience show that managers frequently 
show a  preference for actions having an influence on the 
performance of their company in the short term, and thus 
short-term survival motivations outperform longer-term 
innovation and renewal. This is the issue described by 
March (1991) as the dilemma between exploitation and 
exploration. Short term – even quarterly – interests of 
managers in producing the financial results expected by 
shareholders work against renewal and longer term 
prosperity. 
We have rich ideas supported by theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidences under the heading of 
“ambidextrous organization” (Skat-Rordam, 1999; 
Tushman and Anderson, 2004; Hokansson and Lind, 2004; 
Hokansson, 2010). The research work and the paper by 
Hokansson and Lind (2004) open up a new dimension of 
hopefully fruitful studies by drawing attention to the inter-
organizational dimension of ambidexterity. Approaching 
the problem of how to meet the contrasting requirements 
of short-term efficiency and longer-term innovation, we 
are often faced with the dilemma of “right or left hand” 
(see e.g. Leavitt, 1987). Some managers are encoded for 
managing by their inspiration and vision, named as path-
finding managers by Leavitt (1987), while other prefer 
well-structured approaches supported by rich empirical 
data and quantitative analysis. The present author is 
convinced that new insights into successful and 
unsuccessful business strategies either locally or 
internationally may be obtained through the deep-level 
knowledge and understanding provided by this area of 
investigation. 
In order to be able to understand the deeper levels of 
influencing factors in strategic management decisions we 
have to analyze the psychological, religious, philosophical 
and practical life element as well. This is a huge endeavor 
which requires scholars from many different fields, and 
experiences from different countries have to be collected. 
At the present moment we have good chances in Hungary 
to organize the necessary number and composition of 
researchers and financial support may be acquired through 
the National Long Term Research Grant under the 
auspices of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
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